

# FPTP & Inequality

## Part IV

### How misery drove the English to Brexit

Joining the dots between every greater inequality and the disaster of leaving the EU

Stuart Donald  
2022



Image: Bruce Mackinnon



# How misery drove the English to Brexit

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## I. Fear and frustration

## II. England united to Leave



## III. 'Levelling Down'

## IV. Brexit central: Southern Tory Leave seats

## V. Conclusion



- Maybe only the English and the Welsh voted for Leave...
- But there were more Leave voters in England than the entire combined populations of Scotland, Wales and the North of Ireland




Source: Ashcroft EU ref exit poll 2016 (whole of UK)

**Key takeaway - what England wants, England gets...**




- **Almost 90% of all eligible voters over 55 cast a vote with a huge skew to Leave** – similar to the 2014 Indyref, the older generations voted in greater numbers which dominated the result
- **Middle aged voters more evenly split but Leave still ahead** – those in their 30s favour remain but the 45+ vote Leave contingent outweighs the younger and thinner pro-Europe group
- **Youth abstentions as much about structural poverty as indifference** – the English press blames youth apathy but much of younger underclass may not have voted due to ‘sofa—surfing’ (est 200k+ in London alone) and for fear of debt collectors (Dorling)



Source: Ashcroft EU ref exit poll 2016 (whole of UK)

**Key takeaway - older people both more inclined to vote and to vote Leave**





Source: Ashcroft EU ref exit poll 2016 (whole of UK)

- Decision to leave EU was overwhelming a middle class one - 2/3 of all English people that voted to leave the EU were 'middle class' – social grades 'AB' or 'C1'

- Proportionately more working class than middle class voted to leave – the biggest single group of Leavers were from the highest social class – AB – but poorer voters much more likely to vote Leave

**Key takeaway - Leave vote more driven by middle than working class in absolute numbers**




# and especially if you'd been 'around the block'...

- **Leave victory delivered by those with 'perspective' on recent decades of UK life across all classes** – very clear that the longer your memory of life in the UK, the more inclined you were to vote to leave EU
- **Older Blue collar English voters were the most likely to vote Leave** – although turnout lower, the link between experience of UK life and vote Leave gets stronger as the collars get more blue
- **Astonishing that a majority of 55+ high earners would vote to leave EU** – normally the wealthier classes are largely supportive of the status quo (e.g. our 1<sup>st</sup> Indyref); suggests that even among the more comfortable, the majority returned an anti-establishment vote

**Key takeaway** – the longer 'UK life perspective', the more likely to vote Leave



English Brexit vote split - by class




Source: Ashcroft EU ref exit poll 2016 (whole of UK)



- **Pre-Brexit survey identifies fear of ‘financial insecurity’ as central driver of vote Leave** – a survey\* of 8,000 UK citizens over the weeks prior to the Brexit vote found little correlation between vote Leave and ‘general’ unhappiness with life; but specifically focused on personal financial security, the higher the anxiety, the more likely a voter was to favour leaving the EU
- **Survey suggests that financial fear affect influenced all age groups from mid 35+** – slightly different from the Ashcroft data, the link between specific personal financial fears and vote Leave was as prevalent across all age groups from 35+

### Financial fears and support for vote Leave



Source: Federica Liberini, Andrew J. Oswald, Eugenio Proto & Michela Redoano Sept 2017

**Key takeaways –personal financial security a consistent driver of Leave vote for all from 35+**

\* Survey carried out by the ‘Understanding Society’, using a 1 – 7 scale ‘life-satisfaction’ question, across 8k interviews between 5 Jan and 22 June 2016,



- More middle class than working class voted in EU referendum
- More middle class than working class voted Leave in absolute terms
- People that have been around over the last 20+ years more inclined to vote Leave; across all classes
- People more worried about making ends meet more likely to vote Leave



*So how come Leave was so dominant in England?*



# How misery drove the English to Brexit

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I. Fear and frustration

II. England United to vote Leave

III. 'Levelling Down'


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# The South deliver most of Leave's votes

- Proportionately, more Northerners than Southerners voted to Leave; 57% v 54%
- However, in term of overall numbers and splits, there were more Leavers in the South than the North (even more when London included)
- Turnout was also higher on average in the South than the North



Source: UK electoral commission


**Key takeaway – Brexit was a joint, pan-English region effort**



- We know that the middle class represented more c. 60% of all Leave vote which means a material proportion must be resident in the South as suggested by the chart
- Almost twice as many ABs and C1s live in the South than the North; normally better off people are supportive of the status quo but not in the case of Brexit it seems

**Key takeaway - Brexit was driven by conventional wealth or class based factors**

Social grade working age population breakdown 2011



Source: 2011 census

South North





# far lower levels of deprivation...

Average regional seat rank – English deprivation index 2015\*

- Using the government’s Deprivation Index as at 2019 (see slides 42-44 for more detail), a familiar North v South picture of England can be seen
- This ranks average deprivation scores for parliamentary seats in a region (see slide 42-44 for detail) and shows that the 4 regions of Southern England have much better deprivation rankings – all in the top half of the table – than the North
- But vote Leave achieved similar figures across both North and South


**Key takeaway - Brexit united England across regions despite huge differences in quality of life and standard of living**



\* the deprivation index from 2019 was used but its data set is stamped broadly around 2015/6 in which case a better proxy for attitudes in England at the time of the EU ref




### General Election 1979-2019 – average Tory seats



Source: Electoral Commission

### General Election 2015 – seats by party



Source: Electoral Commission

- Since 1980, the Southern regions have been dominated by Tory MPs
- In the North, the Tories have had far less success
- The GE2015 chart shows how the Tories dominate in rural parts (ex London) and Labour wins most urban seats
- But again, vote Leave achieved similar figures across both North and South

**Key takeaway - Brexit crossed long standing political divides across English towns and counties**

- Vote Leave's success was driven by an unusual coalition across the richer and poorer areas of England



*So what could the common factor be in the North South vote Leave coalition?*

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
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- By the end of 2015, months before the EU ref, the UK had been massively under-performing its peers over a 10 year period
- It was the only one of 16 where the country was generating wealth but on average people were experiencing lower real wages
- Even the UK's **Free-market Fanatic** peers were in the pack
- The UK was struggling more than most with post GFC recovery as well as a particularly severe austerity policy



**Key takeaway - UK was experiencing much more pain than its peers just prior to the Brexit vote**






# the misery was hitting England everywhere...

Levelling down

## Real median weekly earnings: Total change 2004 - 2015




Source: UK govt

- The fall in real wages between 2004 and 2015 was being felt across all regions (inc London this time)
- But the biggest losers were men resident in the South West, South East and the East of England

**Key takeaway:** real wage pain most acutely felt by men in the Southern regions





Source: UK govt


- Unemployment was higher across all regions (apart from London) compared to 2004
- But the biggest losers were men & woman resident in the North East and Yorks / Humberside

**Key takeaway - higher unemployment affecting women in the North the most**

- At the time of the Brexit vote, all of England’s regions had experienced massive hikes in house prices between 2005 and 2015
- In addition to lower real wages and fewer jobs, it was also more difficult than ever to get onto the property ladder
- The most severely impacted regions were the South East and East (outside London)

**Key takeaway** - by end 2015 wages and job misery compounded by house price inflation hitting the South East the hardest


Average house price increases by region: 2005 - 2015



Source: UK govt



Average increase in distance to nearest amenity: 2005 - 2015



Source: UK govt

- And to top it all off, decades of funding cuts saw average distances to the nearest GP, School and Post Office increase due to closures

- In all three cases, the biggest losers were the North West, West Mids and Yorks & Humber

**Key takeaway** - basic amenities further and further away compounding misery across England, particularly the North




# but the data shows all this hit the South the hardest...

- Comparing the rankings of average parliamentary seat scores for each region between 2001 and 2015, the three least deprived regions of England saw a drop in their average ranking (see slides 42-44 for more detail on deprivation rankings)
- The average ranking seats in the the South East, England’s ‘least deprived’ region, fell from 397 (top quartile) to 373 (2<sup>nd</sup> quartile) and the average for East of England fell from 364 to 336.
- These rankings are ‘relative’\* to other seats across the regions but based on the previous section, it is clear that the whole country has suffered overall decline

**Key takeaway - in the 15 years prior to EU ref the 3 wealthiest regions of England all saw falls in relative deprivation rankings**

\* Based on the data in the previous slides, we know that on every measure all regions of England have experienced absolute decline; so while these ranking changes only reflect a relative\* change (i.e. the poorer Northern regions have experienced increases in rank) we know the overall picture has been miserable for all


Deprivation Index\* - Average seat ranking: 2001 - 2015




- The Southern region that saw the highest fall in relative rankings was East England
- On average, between 2001 and 2015, its seats fell by more than 40 rankings (a fall of c 10 percentiles)
- 13 of these seats saw ranking falls in excess of 100 (a fall of c. 20 percentiles)
- Other Southern areas with huge falls in relative ranking were in the Kent, Essex and the coastal areas of the East Midlands

**Key takeaway - material increases in relative deprivation affecting large areas of costal Southern & Eastern England**

2001-2015 change in rank - region



2001-2015 change in rank - seats



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019



At the time of the EU ref in 2016, all of England had been suffering decades of increased hardship:

- Real wages, job opportunities all down
- House prices were through the roof
- Basic amenities all on average further away

But 'leveling down' really happened in the South:

- the more affluent / less deprived South remains more affluent and less deprived; but it had experienced the biggest increase in relative deprivation
- with the costal areas of Southern and Eastern England affected the most



Is there evidence of a link between falling quality of life and vote Leave?

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
**IV. Brexit central: Southern Tory Leave seats**

V. Conclusion





- Around 1/3 of all Leave votes cast came from self-identifying Tories
- The second largest group were those that had not voted in the 2015 General Election
- UKIP and Labour together provided a further 1/3 of total Leave vote



Source: You Gov, UK wide data


**Key takeaway:** Tory voters, typically pro-establishment, voted against the pro-EU 'status quo' in huge numbers



- Of England's 533 parliamentary seats, it has been estimated that 365 returned Leave majorities – 68% of all seats or just over 2/3
  - 274 were in Tory held seats (51% of total seats)
  - 91 Labour held seats (17% of total seats)
- 155 seats, just under a 1/3, returned Leave majorities of > 60%
  - 68 were in the South of which 66 were Tory seats
  - 82 were in North of which 49 were Tory seats
- 116/ 155 (75%) of all seats with > 60% Leave votes were held by Tories in 2015

**Key takeaway:** the Leave vote was most concentrated in the Tory voting more affluent seats of the South

### Leave seats mapped to GE 2015



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016




## Tory Leave seats with relative increases in overall deprivation: 2001 - 2015

- Of all Tory seats in that voted Leave in the EU ref, 177 (2/3) had experienced a fall in overall deprivation rankings between 2001 and 2015 (the ones shown in the maps)
- The two wealthiest / least deprived regions of England – the South East and the East – show strong correlations between increased relative deprivation and vote Leave


**Key takeaway:** Leave concentration higher again amongst South Tory seats where relative deprivation has increased

Change in seat **overall** rank 2001 - 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

Share of vote Leave across GE 2015 Tory seats



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016






- Income deprivation counts the number of people and families on income support
- Across the 177 tory Leave seats with relatively higher deprivation, 144 or 81% saw a relative increase income deprivation
- 2/3 of these seats were in the South of England
- Kent, Cornwall and Bedfordshire saw the biggest changes


## Tory Leave seats with relative increases in overall deprivation: 2001 - 2015

Change in seat rank: **income** 2001 - 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

Share of vote Leave across GE 2015 Tory seats



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016


**Key takeaway:** when the EU ref came, increases in relative income poverty had been impacting particularly the South

- Employment deprivation counts the number of people and families on various unemployment benefits
- Across the 177 affected tory Leave seats, 148 or 84% saw a relative increase employment deprivation
- 3/4 of these seats were in the South of England
- All South and Eastern coastal constituencies were particularly affected

**Key takeaway:** when the EU ref came, relative jobs deprivation had been increasing over 15 years


## Tory Leave seats with relative increases in overall deprivation: 2001 - 2015

Change in seat rank: **employment** 2001 - 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

Share of vote Leave across GE 2015 Tory seats




Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016



- Housing deprivation measure house price increases, availability and distance to core amenities (GPs, POs, schools)
- Across the 177 tory Leave seats with increased deprivation, 106 or 60% saw a relative increase income deprivation
- 4 out of 5 of these seats were in the South of England
- All parts of the South were materially impacted


## Tory Leave seats with relative increases in overall deprivation: 2001 - 2015

Change in seat rank: **housing** 2001 - 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

Share of vote Leave across GE 2015 Tory seats



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016


**Key takeaway:** when the EU ref came, finding affordable housing was harder and schools, GP or POs were further and further away

## Tory Leave seats with relative increases in overall deprivation: 2001 - 2015

- Education deprivation measures primary school, secondary school plus adult attainment and furtherance as well as school attendance
- Across the 177 Tory Leave seats with increased deprivation, 145 or 82% saw a relative increase education deprivation
- 4 out of 5 of these seats were in the South of England


**Key takeaway:** when the EU ref came, something was going wrong in schools in the South of England

Change in seat rank: **education** 2001 - 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

Share of vote Leave across GE 2015 Tory seats




Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016



## Tory Leave seats with relative increases in overall deprivation: 2001 - 2015


- Environmental deprivation measures housing conditions as well as pollution and travelling
- Across the 177 tory Leave seats with increased deprivation, 116 or 66% saw a relative increase environment deprivation
- 7 out of 10 of these seats were in the South of England

Change in seat rank: **environment** 2001 - 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

Share of vote Leave across GE 2015 Tory seats



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016


**Key takeaway:** when the EU ref came, the quality of life across the environment was in relative decline for the South



# all steadily increasing misery across the Tory South...

- the biggest concentration of Leavers was found in Tory seats particularly where relative deprivation was increasing
- the majority of these, particularly in the South, were still amongst the top 50% least deprived seats in 2015
- the data identifies a strong link between a sense of experiencing a deterioration in quality of life and voting to Leave the EU

**Key takeaway:** Brexit was won through middle England Tory voters, beaten down by years of increasing inequality



Deprivation index rank changes: 2001 v 2015

- Relative deterioration in quality of life impacted the South of England across all measures more than the North
- Even though the South remains materially less deprived on average than the North, the biggest, most influential group of Leave voters were Tory voters mostly in Southern England
- Combined, suffering Tories in middle England and the more deprived voters in the North, mustered enough votes to deliver Brexit



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- **Brexit happened because of a massive Leave vote in England** – the whole of Scotland, North of Ireland and Wales could have voted 100% remain and we would still have left the EU; what England wants, England gets
- **Brexit happened because of increasing extreme implications of inequality** - vote Leave was supported by a strong and well funded campaign but anti-establishment voting only really gets mobilised en masse when there is pain. As we know from part 1, England is home to 9 of Europe's 10 poorest regions. But over the last 4 decades, the consequences of ever more acute inequality are now reaching the middle classes.
- **Brexit happened in particular because inequality is now impairing the lives of middle England, not just the poorer North** – although still relatively well off, millions of Tory voters in Southern England have felt their quality of lives deteriorating across income levels, employment opportunities, education outcomes, housing affordability and environment qualities, all driving the Brexit backlash
- **And the higher the relative increase in deprivation in middle England Tory seats, the higher the propensity to vote Leave** – the data shows a very powerful correlation between the Leave vote and increasing relative deprivation across traditionally affluent, Tory England. Hardest hit were the coastal areas of East Midlands, East of England and Kent

**Key takeaway** – Inequality, driven by FPTP over 40 years, was the major driver in deciding the Brexit vote



# Appendix I


a closer look at  
the South East of England

England's wealthiest region






## South East England – key facts



- The largest region in the whole of England
- Home to 9m, 16% of English population
- Electorate of around 6.5m

## Average regional seat deprivation rank



Source: English Deprivation indices 2004 & 2019

- The wealthiest region of the whole of England and the also the least deprived
- However, it has experienced the 2<sup>nd</sup> biggest relative drop in deprivation rankings of all English regions


## Average seats won by Tories 1979 - 2019

Region	tory seats	%
South East	69 / 81	86%
Eastern	45 / 54	83%
South West	37 / 51	73%
East Midlands	27 / 44	61%
West Midlands	29 / 58	50%
London	32 / 78	40%
York & Humber	18 / 55	33%
North West	24 / 77	30%
North East	4 / 30	12%

Source: Electoral commission

- Since 1980, on average has voted in the most Tory MPs of all English regions
- almost 9 out of every 10 MPs returned to Westminster have been Tories

## Share of English vote 'Leave'




- South East was home to 2.6m Leave voters;
- Just under 1/3 of all Southern England Brexiteers and 1/5 of all English Brexiteers
- The wealthiest English region provided the most Brexit votes






Multiple Index rank 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

- In aggregate, in 2015, the South East was the least deprived of all English regions
- Just under ½ (48%) of all South East seats are in the top decile (least deprived) with none in the bottom decile


General election seats 2015



The Electoral Commission

- 74/84 seats were Tory seats in the 2015 GE, the highest regional concentration of Tory seats in any English region
- GE2015 returned 5 seats more than the average since 1979, sitting at 69/81 (also the highest average for any English region)

Brexit vote by seat 2016



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016


- The strongest concentration of Leave votes was in coastal Kent, where all but 1 seat from Medway to Hastings had a Leave vote < 60%
- The South East had the highest number of remain seats after London in England with 36








Multiple Index rank change 2001- 2015



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

Tory Leave seats with lower relative deprivation rankings: 2001 - 2015



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016

- Only 15/84 South East seats saw an increase (improvement, green seats above) in relative deprivation rankings 2001 and 2015
- The Kent seats had the largest fall in relative deprivation rankings across the region

- The correlation between the seats experiencing the greatest increase in deprivation and the highest vote Leave score is striking as indicated by the red dashed boxes





# Appendix II








## Background to the English indices of Deprivation



# What are the English indices of deprivation?

- 7 indicators measuring quality of life used by the Office of National Statistics (ONS)
- Surveys carried out every 4 or 5 years since 2000
- Detailed analysis of 32,000 areas of roughly 1,500 people that can be aggregated to wards, parliamentary seats or regions
- Allow relative\* comparisons to be made over time through changes in rankings and where possible, inferences around quality of life / inequality to be drawn

\* see slide 44 for more detail


Indicator	Scope	Weight in IMD	IMD 'Index Multiple- deprivation'
 <b>Income</b>	<i>Proportion of population experiencing deprivation relating to low income</i>	<b>22.5%</b>	
 <b>Employment</b>	<i>Proportion of population of working age population in an area involuntarily excluded from the labour market</i>	<b>22.5%</b>	
 <b>Health</b>	<i>The risk of premature death and the impairment of quality of life through poor physical or mental health</i>	<b>13%</b>	
 <b>Education</b>	<i>The lack of attainment and skills in the local population</i>	<b>13%</b>	
 <b>Barriers to Housing</b>	<i>The physical and financial accessibility of housing and local services</i>	<b>13%</b>	
 <b>Living Environment</b>	<i>The quality of both the 'indoor' and 'outdoor' local environment</i>	<b>13%</b>	
 <b>Crime</b>	<i>The risk of personal and material victimization at local level</i>	<b>13%</b>	

**IMD = Index of Multiple Deprivation, provides an aggregated perspective of quality of life...**



# How the review compiles the deprivation data

- For this piece of work, data has been re-mapped to parliamentary seats to be able to compare GEs, EU ref votes and deprivation levels:
- 8 regions and 533 parliamentary seats – home to 55m people, 84% of UK total
  - The North**
    - North East 29 seats
    - North West 75 seats
    - West Midlands 59 seats
    - Yorks & Humber 53 seats
  - The South**
    - South East 84 seats
    - East of England 58 seats
    - London 78 seats
    - South West 55 seats
    - East Midlands 46 seats
- Each seat is ranked amongst the 533 seats and changes in rank are compared between 2004 (using mostly 2001 data) and 2019 (using mostly 2015 data)
- The 2019 survey used data mostly from 2015/16 – the time of the Brexit referendum and 2004 used mostly 2001 data; for this reason we refer to 2001 and 2015 although the reviews were dates to 2004 and 2019 respectively



# Additional info on the deprivation index work

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## Mapping the datasets to Parliamentary Constituency level

The Indices of Deprivation are produced at Lower-layer Super Output Area level, using the most recent Lower-layer Super Output Areas.

For this work, following the guidance in Appendix A to the 2019 technical report, the LSOA data has been aggregated to parliamentary constituency level using the three-step process recommended by the ONS

1. Identify the lookup table from Lower-layer Super Output Areas (for which data is published) to the areas of interest (seats);
2. Sum the population-weighted scores from Lower-layer Super Output Areas to the areas of interest (using the published population denominators);
3. Rank the resulting scores across the areas of interest.

For the 2004 dataset the ONS lookup tables used were the following:

- Code for SOA 2001 mapped to Code for LSOA 2011
- Code for LSOA 2011 to Code for ward 2018
- Code for Ward 2018 to Parliamentary Constituency 2018

For the 2019 dataset, the ONS lookup tables used were the following:

- Code for LSOA 2011 to Code for ward 2018
- Code for Ward 2018 to Parliamentary Constituency 2018

## Making comparisons of the deprivation data over time

The primary purpose of the Indices of Deprivation is to measure as accurately as possible the relative distribution of deprivation at a small area level, but they are not designed to provide 'backwards' comparability with previous versions of the Indices and the versions of the Indices should not be used as a time-series. However, because there is a broadly consistent methodology between the Indices of Deprivation between 2019 and previous versions (using the same approach, structure and methodology), this does allow some comparisons to be made over time, but only in terms of comparing the rankings as determined at the relevant time point for each of the versions of the Indices.

This means that, when exploring changes in deprivation between versions of the Indices, changes can only be described in relative terms, for example, the extent to which an area has changed rank or decile of deprivation between the current and previous Indices. It would not necessarily be correct to state that the level of deprivation in the area has increased on some absolute scale, as it may be the case that all areas had improved, but that some areas had improved more slowly than others. In the situation where the absolute levels of deprivation in all areas were increasing or decreasing at the same rate, the ranks would show no change.

# Appendix III


## Some other correlations of vote Leave

**A. Leave and increasing deprivation**

**B. Leave and immigration levels**

# A. Leave and increasing deprivation

## Brexit vote seat breakdown



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

- Over 1/3 of all English seats were vote Leave majority seats, held by the Tories where relative deprivation levels rose
- Less than 20% of English seats held by labour voted to Leave


## Tory Leave 'faller' seat stats – 2001 to 2015

2001 to 2015 relative ranking decile	average leave vote	# seats in decile	av fall in ranks (places / 533)
6	60%	18	(6)
7	58%	32	(15)
8	59%	35	(28)
9	59%	37	(45)
10	62%	51	(71)

Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

- The higher the deprivation level suffered by a Tory held 'faller' seat, the more likely they were to vote Leave
- Weighted average Tory Leave faller seat was 60% and av ranking place drop was 34

## Correlation of Tory Leave 'faller' seats v Brexit vote



Source: English Deprivation index 2004 & 2019

- The correlation between one decile fall in relative rankings and the propensity to vote Leave was 0.5; for every incremental decile fall, 0.5% more people voted Leave




# B . Leave and immigration levels

- Areas with the highest vote Leave levels were typically areas with very low levels of immigration
- biting inequality believed to drive more insular views of immigrants particularly in areas where there is little immigration experience


**Key takeaway –**  
Brexit delivered by misery

### % of immigration by seat – census 2011



Source: The Migration Observatory (UK census 2011)

### Leave seats mapped to GE 2015



Source: Chris Hanretty, Journal Of Elections 2016